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THE DRUG QUALITY AND THE 
SECURITY ACT OF 2013: 
COMPOUNDING CONSISTENTLY* 
STELLA HAEYOUNG KIM** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Starting in the summer of 2012, contaminated steroid injections com-
pounded by the New England Compounding Center (“NECC”) were causing 
fungal meningitis.1 By 2013, more than 800 people across twenty-three states 
were affected, resulting in sixty-four deaths.2 Reminiscent of past public health 
crises of sulfanilamide and thalidomide,3 the NECC meningitis outbreak imme-
diately demanded legislative action. A bill for reform was swiftly passed and on 
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 1.  STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 113TH CONG., FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF NECC 
AND AMERIDOSE: A HISTORY OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES? 1 (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter HOUSE 
STAFF REPORT]. Fungal meningitis is a life-threatening rare infection of the membrane that surrounds the 
brain and spinal cord. The more common etiologies of meningitis are bacterial and viral. Regardless, any 
type of meningitis is life-threatening and can be fatal if not treated immediately. Meningitis, CDC (Mar. 
4, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/meningitis/index.html. 
 2.  Kurt Eichenwald, Killer Pharmacy: Inside a Medical Mass Murder Case, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 16, 
2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/24/inside-one-most-murderous-corporate-crimes-us-history-
322665.html; see also HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 1. 
 3.  See infra Part II.A. 
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November 27, 2013, President Barack Obama signed the Drug Quality and Se-
curity Act (“DQSA”), giving the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) direct authority over large-scale compounding.4 Overall, the DQSA is 
a direct response to the NECC crisis and its main purpose is to prevent another 
national compounded drug calamity from ever happening again. 
To evaluate whether the DQSA will prevent history from repeating itself, 
this note is divided into four parts following this Introduction. Part II discusses 
significant historical events that incentivized changes in drug regulation and col-
lectively provided an impetus for the DQSA. Part III delves into the current reg-
ulatory landscape of large-scale sterile compounding by examining FDA guid-
ance documents on the standard that should be used for sterile compounding and 
how this compares to what the standard was before the DQSA. Part IV explores 
selected issues and implications that need further evaluation and clarification by 
FDA in order for the DQSA to successfully become what it was intended for and 
more—the safe production and distribution of customized medicine that has the 
potential to treat unique conditions and alleviate drug shortages. Lastly, Part V 
briefly summarizes the past, present, and hopeful future of drug compounding 
where it will be regulated routinely to produce consistently sterile compounded 
drugs for safe patient use. 
II.  REGULATORY JURISDICTION 
Before the DQSA, the regulatory jurisdiction regarding drug compounding 
was inconsistent due to amendments, regulations, and conflicting case rulings. 
Furthermore, the landscape of health care was changing. Compounds—once a 
mainstay of healthcare—became second-tier for an extended period of time until 
they resurfaced as efficient alternatives to unavailable yet necessary treatments 
customized for patients with special needs. Policies had to adapt, but these were 
inefficient and ineffective because every change only caused unnecessary con-
flict and greater confusion. This section discusses the regulatory landscape pre-
DQSA and post-DQSA to explain how the regulatory landscape changed since 
1938 until the passage of the DQSA, which made the landscape more uniform 
and clearer than before. 
A.  Pre-DQSA: No One Had Explicitly Clear Regulatory Authority over 
Compounding 
Before the DQSA, the regulation of compounding progressively became 
complicated as compounded drugs became a prominently different category of 
drugs than commercially manufactured drugs.5 Traditionally, drugs were com-
 
 4. H.R. 3204, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted). 
 5. See infra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
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pounds concocted by pharmacists by combining and mixing different drug in-
gredients or altering a drug for a specific patient or indication.6 Drug regulation 
was minimal and FDA did not exist until 1930.7 
Significant federal regulation of drugs began in 1938 when Congress passed 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), delegating authority to FDA to 
oversee the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics.8 This act was passed in response 
to the 1937 sulfanilamide disaster during which more than one hundred people 
died.9 S.E. Massengill, a drug manufacturer, seized a commercial opportunity to 
make and ship out a total of 633 shipments of sulfanilamide in a new, liquid 
form.10 Regrettably, the company failed to test the product for safety—it turned 
out that the solvent used, diethylene glycol, was a poisonous chemical.11 Thus, 
the FDCA was quickly passed to ensure that “the distribution of highly potent 
drugs . . . be controlled by an adequate Federal Food and Drug law.”12 After 
1938, manufacturers had to get pre-market approval from FDA, which meant 
that drugs now had to be safe prior to marketing.13 The FDCA of 1938, however, 
 
 6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-702, DRUG COMPOUNDING: CLEAR AUTHORITY 
AND MORE RELIABLE DATA NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN FDA OVERSIGHT 1 (2013) [hereinafter GAO 
COMPOUNDING REPORT] (“Drug compounding is the process by which a pharmacist or doctor combines, 
mixes, or alters ingredients to create a drug tailored to the medical needs of an individual patient.”). There 
are many other definitions of “compounding” by different organizations that vary in how inclusive or 
specific it wants to be. For example, the International Academy of Compounding Pharmacists defines 
“compounding” as the preparation of a customized medication that is not commercially available. Com-
pounding FAQs, IACP, http://www.iacprx.org/?page=2 (last visited Jan. 6, 2016). The emphasis is on 
being unattainable as a manufactured drug. GAO’s definition emphasizes the aspect of being a “tailored” 
medication. DQSA defines compounding to “include[] the combining, admixing, mixing, diluting, pool-
ing, reconstituting, or other altering of a drug or bulk drug substance to create a drug.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 353b(d)(1) (2013). DQSA lists the different acts of compounding “to create a drug.” The emphasis is on 
creating a drug; therefore, it needs to be regulated by FDA. 
 7. The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was “vague and less than what…supporters of federal food 
and drug regulation had hoped for,” but it did establish the first federal food and drug regulation that was 
originally headed by the Bureau of Chemistry. It was not until 1927 when the Bureau of Chemistry was 
divided into two departments, one of which was titled the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration 
(“FDIA”). In 1930, FDIA shortened to FDA. Andrea T. Borchers et al. The History and Contemporary 
Challenges of the US Food and Drug Administration, 29 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 1, 4, 6 (2007). 
 8. ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43038, FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE 
COMPOUNDING OF HUMAN DRUGS 2 (2013); see also Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current 
version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006)) (giving FDA authority over the approval of “new drug” products 
into interstate commerce).   
 9. Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, 
FDA CONSUMER MAG. (Jun. 1981), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegula-
tion/ SulfanilamideDisaster/default.htm. 
 10. At the time, sulfanilamide was only available as tablet or powder form and when the liquid form 
was tested, it was only tested for flavor, appearance, and fragrance. Id. 
 11. Diethylene glycol is normally used as antifreeze. Id. 
 12. Id. (quoting FDA Commissioner Walter Campbell). 
 13. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 355(a) (2006). 
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did not specifically address the act of drug compounding by pharmacists in phar-
macies separate from manufacturing drugs.14 
Compounding was first mentioned in the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amend-
ments of 1962 (“Kefauver-Harris Amendments”)15 that were enacted in response 
to yet another drug catastrophe: the thalidomide crisis.16 Thalidomide was used 
as an anti-emetic for pregnant women suffering from morning sickness.17 The 
drug caused major birth defects in the children of women who took thalidomide 
during their first trimesters of their pregnancies.18 In the 1950s, it was believed 
that mother and fetus were two individual entities, completely separated by an 
impermeable placenta.19 Relying on this erroneous belief, drug manufacturers 
did not study the teratogenicity of their drugs.20 Moreover, under the FDCA of 
1938, showing that a drug was safe for use was almost unnecessary because if 
FDA did not decide on an application of a new drug in the allotted time, the drug 
automatically got approved.21 The detrimental effects of thalidomide proved that 
the FDCA of 1938 needed an update. 
 
 14. Federal and State Role in Pharmacy Compounding and Reconstitution: Exploring the Right Mix 
to Protect Patients: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 108th Cong., 41 
(2003) [hereinafter 2003 Congressional Hearing] (statement of Steven K. Galson, Deputy Director, Cen-
ter for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.) (recognizing that the FDCA of 1938 had 
“no provisions specifically dedicated to compounding, as distinguished from manufacturing of drugs”); 
see also NOLAN, supra note 8, at 2. 
 15. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 792–93 (1962) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(2) (2006)) 
(using “compound” within a group of words to describe drug preparation: “manufacture, prepare, propa-
gate, compound, or process drugs.”). 
 16. Jerry Avorn, Learning About the Safety of Drugs—A Half-Century of Evolution, NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2151, 2153 (2011) (recognizing that the devastating effects of thalidomide seen around the world 
accelerated the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, “setting the stage for new authority for the FDA for dec-
ades to come”). 
 17. Id. at 2152. In the United States, FDA never approved thalidomide, but women were able to 
obtain the popular drug while traveling abroad to Europe, Australia, and Canada or from their doctors who 
received samples for company-sponsored studies in pursuit of FDA approval. Id. at 2153. The American 
drug company that was manufacturing thalidomide at the time distributed more than 2.5 million thalido-
mide tablets to 1267 doctors who then distributed the drug to about 20,000 pregnant patients leading to 
seventeen affected infants in the United States. George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, Thalidomide and the 
Titanic: Reconstructing the Technology Tragedies of the Twentieth Century, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 98, 
99 (1999). 
 18. Avorn, supra note 16, at 2152 (describing infants being born with severe limb deformities where 
hands or feet were directly emerging from their torsos). 
 19. Deborah A. Goldman, Thalidomide Use: Past History and Current Implications for Practice, 28 
ONCOL. NURS. FORUM, 471, 472 (2001) (discussing how pregnant women in the 1950s were not warned 
against the effects of drugs or alcohol because it was believed that nothing crossed the placenta to harm 
the fetus). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA CONSUMER MAG., 
CENTENNIAL ED. (2006), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/ Pro-
motingSafeandEffectiveDrugsfor100Years/default.htm. 
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After the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, drugs had to be safe and effec-
tive.22 Effectiveness is how well a drug works for its intended use, proven by 
extensive research and clinical trials that test the drug in different subgroups of 
the population.23 Under this definition, thalidomide as an anti-emetic for preg-
nant women is an ineffective and unsafe drug because thalidomide crosses the 
placenta, causing irreversible harm to the developing fetus.24 Safety and effec-
tiveness has to be demonstrated together for FDA to evaluate the risks and ben-
efits of approving a new drug for its intended use.25 
However, pharmacies that compounded were exempt from the require-
ments of proving safety and effectiveness of a product before it went to market 
as long as the compound was made in response to a physician’s prescription and 
within “the regular course of [the pharmacy’s] business of dispensing or selling 
drugs . . . at retail.”26 Moreover, FDA delegated the regulation of compounding 
to the states: “The provisions . . . shall not apply to pharmacies which maintain 
establishments in conformance with any applicable local laws regulating the 
practice of pharmacy . . . .”27 This set up a dichotomy of regulating drug distrib-
utors in the United States. FDA regulated the manufacturing of drugs and states 
regulated the compounding of drugs until the passage of the DQSA in 2013.28 
1.  Return of Pharmacy Compounding Instigated FDA’s Attempt to Reclaim 
Its Regulatory Authority 
Once the main method of creating a drug, compounding took a backseat 
when commercial manufacturing of drugs became more efficient and popular in 
 
 22. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2006)) (inserting 
the words, “safety” and “effectiveness” into the definition of a “new drug”); see generally 21 U.S.C. 
§ 351(a) (2006) (detailing what an adulterated drug is and stating that such a drug would be considered 
unsafe for consumer use). 
 23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006) (defining effectiveness of a drug as the evaluation of “substantial ev-
idence” that “consist[s] of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, 
by experts qualified by scientific training and experience” who can “fairly and responsibly” conclude that 
“the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof”). 
 24. Goldman, supra note 19, at 472. Thalidomide is still on the market today, but to treat leprosy and 
certain types of cancer. For cancer patients, the risks outweigh the benefits of using thalidomide. Id. at 
471. 
 25. In order for a new drug to be marketed in the U.S., it must be approved by FDA through a New 
Drug Application (“NDA”). In a NDA, the manufacturer must provide details of the drug’s safety and 
effectiveness for its proposed indication(s) through extensive clinical trials; whether the benefits outweigh 
the risks; and methods use to demonstrate the preservation of the drug’s identity, strength, quality, and 
purity. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2015); see also New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/ howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approv-
alapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2015). 
 26. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(2)(A) (2006). But see infra Part II.A.2. 
 27. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 28. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 362 (2002) (“For approximately the first 50 
years after FDCA, FDA generally left regulation of compounding to the States.”). 
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the 1960s.29 However, the demand for compounds began to re-emerge in the 
1980s and 1990s, as drugs were becoming short in supply and complicated dis-
ease states called for customized medications.30 The number of large-scale com-
pounding pharmacies increased to cater to these demands.31 These pharmacies 
began to blur the line between compounding and conventional manufacturing by 
either reproducing exact copies of commercially available products, using unap-
proved or withdrawn32 active ingredients, and/or producing large quantities that 
often involved interstate commerce.33 Although FDA delegated authority over 
compounding to the states due to the assumption that compounds were done in 
small quantities within individual state borders,34 the expansion of pharmacy 
compounding prompted FDA to exercise its authority through various lawmak-
ing actions. 
First, in response to the increase of borderline manufacturing practices by 
compounders, FDA issued the Compliance Policy Guide in 1992 (“1992 CPG”), 
which listed nine factors FDA would consider when assessing whether a com-
pounder was acting like a manufacturer.35 If a compounder was determined to be 
 
 29. Roy Guharoy, et al. Compounding Pharmacy Conundrum: “We Cannot Live Without Them but 
We Cannot Live With Them,” 143 CHEST 896, 896 (2013) (noting that approximately 80% of prescriptions 
were compounded in the 1950s, then “the paradigm changed in the 1960s with the commercial availability 
of many products, and pharmacy practice gradually transitioned to dispensing of FDA-approved commer-
cial products”). 
 30. Id.; see also Patrick J. Coyne et al., Compounded Drugs: Are Customized Prescription Drugs a 
Salvation, Snake Oil, or Both?, 8 J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE NURSING 222, 222 (2006) (noting that com-
pounding has been increasing in the past 20 years due to increase in demand for home health care, total 
parenteral nutrition, and pain management in hospice care); see also David Brown, Compounding Phar-
macies Rise in Popularity but Bring Questions About Safety, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/ national/health-science/compounding-pharmacies-rise-in-popularity-
but-bring-questions-about-safety/2012 /10/13/e87f8cc2-14a0-11e2-ba83a7a396e6b2a7_story.html (not-
ing the continued popularity in compounding into the 21st century, “driven by the rise of out-of-hospital 
surgical care, the high prices and shortages of drugs, and the real or imagined benefit of ‘personalized 
medicine’”). 
 31. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6 (reporting that although the exact number of 
compounding is unknown, IACP estimated that in 2013, compounding made up about one to three percent 
of the U.S. prescription drug market and there has been an increase in hospitals outsourcing for drug 
compounding in the last decade, estimating that nearly all hospitals outsource for sterile compounded 
products). 
 32. Withdrawn active ingredient drugs are those that are taken off the market by FDA due to safety 
or effectiveness reasons. 21 U.S.C. §§ 353a(b)(1)(C), 353b(a)(4) (2006). 
 33. 2003 Congressional Hearing, supra note 14, at 6, 38, 39 (2003) (statement of Steven K., Acting 
Director, Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.) (recognizing that with the 
growth of compounding included true medical needs for compounding, but also purely economic reasons 
where pharmacies were compounding drugs that were removed from the market or exact copies of com-
mercially available drugs, selling them at low costs in large amounts and making hefty profits). 
 34. Kevin Outterson, Regulating Compounding Pharmacies after NECC, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1969, 1971 (2012) (stating that Congress recognized states as capable of effectively regulating traditional 
compounding pharmacies because of the smaller volume and lack of interstate commerce). 
 35. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 363 (citing U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7132.16, MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION AND PROMOTION OF 
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manufacturing instead of compounding, FDA could choose from a range of en-
forcement actions that included issuing warning letters, injunctions, and even 
criminal charges.36 The 1992 CPG was an enforcement tool for FDA. 
Many pharmacies and pharmacy organizations were upset with the more 
extensive federal oversight outlined in the 1992 CPG.37 In Professionals & Pa-
tients for Customized Care v. Shalala, the plaintiff argued that the 1992 CPG 
was invalid because it did not go through the proper administrative procedure to 
become an enforceable rule.38 The Fifth Circuit held otherwise, stating that the 
1992 CPG was a valid statement of policy or an interpretive rule, which did not 
need to be processed through administrative procedures.39 
To inarguably solidify FDA’s role of regulating compounding, Congress 
passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (“FDAMA”) of 
1997 with the 1992 CPG incorporated into it.40 The FDAMA amended the FDCA 
by creating Section 503A, titled “Pharmacy Compounding.”41 This provision 
states that a compound is technically a new drug, but it will be exempt from FDA 
regulation as long as the outlined conditions are followed.42 Under the FDAMA, 
compounding is valid as long as a licensed pharmacist or doctor compounds the 
drug using approved ingredients for an identifiable patient with a receipt of a 
 
ADULTERATED, MISBRANDED, OR UNAPPROVED NEW DRUGS FOR HUMAN USE BY STATE-LICENSED 
PHARMACIES (Mar. 16, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 CPG]); see also infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 36. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 363; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 460.200, PHARMACY COMPOUNDING 4 (May 29, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 
CPG]. 
 37. Outterson, supra note 34, at 1969 (noting that the 1992 CPG “attracted enough criticism that 
Congress created a safe-harbor compounding statute in 1997, amending the FDCA with a new section, 
503A”). 
 38. 56 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1995) (alleging that the 1992 CPG was invalid because it did not satisfy 
the notice-and comment requirements of the Administration Procedure Act). 
 39. Id. at 602. 
 40. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 7. 
 41. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, 2328 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2006)) (amend-
ing Chapter V of Title 21 and adding a section specifically for pharmacy compounding). 
 42. A compounded drug will be exempt from manufacturing requirements of §§ 351(a)(2)(B), 
352(f)(1), and 355 as long as the drug is compounded for “an identified individual patient based on the 
unsolicited receipt of a valid prescription order or a notation, approved by the prescribing practitioner, on 
the prescription order that a compounded product is necessary for the identified patient” and the compound 
is prepared by a licensed pharmacist or physician. 21 U.S.C § 353a(a). Furthermore, a compound may be 
prepared in advance of a valid prescription as long as it is prepared by a licensed pharmacist or physician 
in limited quantities and based on a history of receiving such valid prescription orders as well as on an 
established relationship between the licensed compounder and the individual patient or the practitioner 
writing the prescription. Id. 
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valid prescription.43 Moreover, the compound could not be advertised or pro-
moted44 or be a copy of a commercially available product, listed in the Federal 
Register of withdrawn unsafe drugs, or compounded in excessive amounts.45 
Under the new law, the main difference between compounding and manu-
facturing was that there needed to be a pre-existing valid prescription for a com-
pound to be made; a compound could not be made before the receipt of an order 
whereas manufacturing could be done in large quantities without prescriptions.46 
As long as compounders followed this general rule, they were regulated by the 
state.47 Once they showed signs of “manufacturing,” FDA would step in and take 
over authority in a similar fashion outlined by the 1992 CPG.48 
However, the validity of Section 503A was brought to issue for the next 
few years. In 2001, a group of pharmacies in Western States Medical Center v. 
Shalala challenged Section 503A, arguing that the prohibition against advertis-
ing their products was a violation of their First Amendment free speech rights.49 
The Ninth Circuit ruled in their favor and held that this specific subsection of 
Section 503A was invalid.50 However, the Ninth Circuit decided that the rest of 
the section was not severable; thus, all of Section 503A had to be made invalid.51 
The Court reasoned, “[a] statute’s constitutional provisions are not severable if 
the entire statute is designed to strike a balance between competing interests”—
meaning manufacturers and compounders.52 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Although pharmacies could not advertise compounded products, letting the public know of their 
services was not prohibited. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, 2330 (1997), repealed by Drug Quality 
and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587, 598 (2013) (striking subsection on advertising of 
compounded drug products). 
 45. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, 2329 (1997) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 353a (2013)). 
 46. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 47. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 48. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 7. 
 49. 238 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2001) (contending that the government cannot regulate commercial 
speech therefore making the FDAMA unconstitutional). 
 50. Id. at 1096 (holding that the free speech restrictions of the FDAMA are “more extensive than 
necessary” and “[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to 
keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good”) (quoting 44 Liquormart 
v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996)). 
 51. W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d at 1096 (opining that “Sections 353a(a) and (c) cannot 
be severed from the rest of the FDAMA unless Congress would have enacted the constitutional provisions 
of the FDAMA absent the unconstitutional provisions”). 
 52. See id. (looking to the FDAMA’s legislative history to show that Congress had good intentions 
to make compounded drugs accessible to the public while “preventing pharmacies from making an end 
run around the FDA’s drug manufacturing requirements”). 
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A year later, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Western States Medical 
Center affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that advertising restrictions were un-
constitutional.53 However, the Supreme Court remained silent as to the severa-
bility issue that the Ninth Circuit ruled on in Western States Medical Center v. 
Shalala.54 As a result, the Ninth Circuit continued to uphold that all of Section 
503A was invalid, thereby rendering FDA’s regulatory authority in the Ninth 
Circuit nearly extinct. 
To regain its authority over compounding, FDA updated the CPG in 2002 
(“2002 CPG”).55 Like its predecessor, the 2002 CPG listed nine factors that 
would demonstrate when a pharmacy was engaged in manufacturing and not 
compounding.56 The 2002 CPG, similar to Section 503A, emphasized that FDA 
would only take action against pharmacies that were suspected of manufacturing 
instead of compounding and deferred the rest of compounding matters to the 
States.57 As a result, the Ninth Circuit could no longer rely on Section 503A as a 
legally binding authority; instead, it only had the non-legally binding FDA guid-
ance of the 2002 CPG to assist FDA’s authority to identify and reprimand man-
ufacturing compounders. 
The situation became more complicated after the Fifth Circuit rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding of non-severability in Medical Center Pharmacy v. 
Mukasey.58 The Fifth Circuit held that the provision banning advertising was in-
valid and indeed severable from the rest of Section 503A, making the rest of the 
provisions valid.59 The Court reasoned that “[u]nless it is evident that the Legis-
 
 53. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 377 (holding that forbidding advertising would 
affect not just large-scale compounders, but everyday pharmacists with good intentions of trying to pro-
vide exceptional health care, such as when a pharmacist wants to inform a parent of the different flavorings 
that can be added to a child’s medicine to make it more tasty or informing doctors about different ways a 
drug can be compounded so a patient who is unable to swallow a tablet can take the medicine more easily). 
 54. See id. at 360 (noting that because petitioners challenged only the constitutional holding of the 
Court of Appeals’ decision and the respondents did not cross-petition, the Court only addressed the First 
Amendment issue and not the severability issue). 
 55. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 8. 
 56. The nine non-exhaustive factors assesses whether the compound: (1) was done in anticipation of 
a prescription order; (2) is a copy of a drug that has been withdrawn or removed from the market; (3) is 
prepared from bulk ingredients; (4) was prepared without a written assurance from the supplier that each 
drug substance was made in FDA-registered facility; (5) used drug components not in compliance with 
official compendia requirements; (6) used commercial scale manufacturing or testing equipment; (7) was 
prepared for third parties who resell the drugs; (8) is just a copy of a commercially available drug; and (9) 
was prepared by complying with applicable state law. 2002 CPG, supra note 36, at 3–4. 
 57. Id. at 3. 
 58. 536 F.3d 383, 404 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on legislative history 
that Congress would not have enacted FDAMA without the advertising provisions because Congress made 
many other provisions to address FDA concerns of illegal large-scale compounding and restricting adver-
tising was just one of those ways). 
 59. Id. at 405. 
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lature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, inde-
pendently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is 
fully operative as law.”60 
After the Fifth Circuit ruling in Medical Center Pharmacy, the country was 
divided as to the validity of Section 503A and the regulation of pharmacy com-
pounding.61 States within the Ninth Circuit62 did not honor Section 503A and so 
followed the 2002 CPG.63 States within the Fifth Circuit64 only invalidated the 
ban on advertising of Section 503A and thus followed the rest of the provisions 
and the 2002 CPG.65 The rest of the states had to reconcile the decisions of the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits to determine FDA’s authority over pharmacy com-
pounding.66 This three-way split set up a confusing and perhaps arbitrary land-
scape for compounding regulation, perpetuating delay of enforcement action by 
FDA.67 Despite forty years since the passage of the Kefauver-Harris Amend-
ments, the regulation of pharmacy compounding was still in question. There 
lacked a uniform national law pertaining to compounding drugs, which set up a 
dangerous foundation for unregulated compounding. 
2. FDA Had Authority Over Pharmacy Compounding Under FDCA, But 
Remained Cautious 
Regardless of the conflicting regulatory landscape of state versus federal 
authority over compounding, FDA had authority over large-scale compounding 
because compounds are drugs and the FDCA generally gives FDA authority over 
all drugs.68 Case law also supports FDA’s authority over large-scale compound-
ing.69 However, FDA remained cautious with NECC leading up to the 2012 
events because of the conflicting regulatory landscape.70 
 
 60. See id. at 401–02 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (internal 
quotation omitted) (reasoning that the intent of Congress was made clear in FDCA § 391, which addresses 
severability: “any provision of this chapter . . . declared unconstitutional, or the applicability thereof to 
any person or circumstances is held invalid, the constitutionality of the remainder of the chapter and the 
applicability thereof to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby”). 
 61. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 8, 36. 
 62. Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. 
 63. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 36. 
 64. Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 
 65. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
 66. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 36 (noting that in the majority of the country, 
FDA used criteria from both Section 503A and the 2002 CPG to assist in its determination of whether it 
would take enforcement action or not on compounding pharmacies). 
 67. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 68. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(1). See infra text accompanying note 81. 
 69. See infra text accompanying notes 85–87. 
 70. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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FDA was affected by the split landscape, being “too cautious because of 
fears of litigation that might actually further undermine [its] ability to apply au-
thorities and take enforcement actions . . . .”71 FDA’s internal confusion and cau-
tion about its authority over compounding is best demonstrated by looking at the 
history between NECC and FDA that ultimately led to the agency’s inaction and 
NECC’s continued production of unsafe compounded drugs. 
FDA knew about NECC’s illegitimate practices since 2002 through re-
ported adverse events involving steroid injections that were causing meningitis-
like symptoms.72 Subsequently, FDA inspected NECC three times by 2004.73 
However, it was not until December 2006 that FDA finally issued a warning 
letter mandating the owner of NECC, Barry Cadden, to “promptly correct these 
deviations” or face regulatory action, including seizure or injunction.74 Before 
the warning letter was sent, FDA did not know whether inspecting NECC was 
appropriate, which further delayed FDA acting on the new complaints and re-
ports of adverse events for different compounds made by NECC.75 After receiv-
ing Mr. Cadden’s response to the warning letter one month later, FDA then ques-
tioned whether it was appropriate to inspect NECC before responding to Mr. 
Cadden.76 Even after FDA finally replied to Mr. Cadden in November 2008, it 
continued to postpone inspections for unknown reasons.77 However, an internal 
email reveals that FDA’s delay may have been due to the split regulatory land-
scape—Massachusetts was one of the states that had to reconcile the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuit decisions.78  If FDA were to inspect NECC, it wanted to make sure 
NECC would satisfy the criteria for manufacturing outlined in the 2002 CPG and 
did not qualify for the exemptions of FDA oversight outlined in Section 503A so 
that NECC could not file a petition against FDA.79 Consequently and unfortu-
nately, no further inspections were made until the 2012 meningitis outbreak.80 
 
 71. A Continuing Investigation into the Fungal Meningitis Outbreak and Whether it Could Have 
Been Prevented: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong., 59 (2013) [hereinafter Meningitis Outbreak 2013 House Hearing] 
(statement of Margaret A. Hamburg, Commissioner, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.). 
 72. HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. 
 73. Id. at 7–8. 
 74. Id. at 10. 
 75. Id. at 11. 
 76. Id. at 13, 16. 
 77. Id. at 18. 
 78. See id.at 18–19 (recognizing that NECC could file a petition against FDA if FDA could not de-
finitively demonstrate that NECC “fell outside the safe harbor provided to traditional compounding phar-
macies under section 503A”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 3 (noting that FDA failed to take any enforcement actions against NECC because it 
“has been grappling with its authority over compounding for decades” and it let that “uncertainty to es-
sentially paralyze the agency’s oversight efforts from 2009 to 2012”). 
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Whether FDA had the authority to inspect a compounding pharmacy out-
side of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits pre-DQSA can be assessed by first looking 
at the FDCA. The FDCA generally gives FDA the authority to inspect any es-
tablishment where “food, drugs, devices, tobacco products, or cosmetics are 
manufactured, processed, packed, or held . . . .”81 However, pharmacy records 
are off-limits if the pharmacy is in compliance with local laws that regulate the 
practice of pharmacy.82 Under the plain reading of the FDCA, FDA has the au-
thority to enter and inspect any compounding pharmacy upon reasonable and 
appropriate qualifications.83 FDA used this authority to inspect a number of com-
pounding pharmacies in the past,84 as exemplified in a Third Circuit case from 
2005. 
In Wedgewood Village Pharmacy, Inc. v. United States, the Third Circuit 
held that the text of the FDCA clearly authorizes FDA to inspect compounding 
pharmacies.85 The Court stated that although the 2002 CPG has no legal author-
ity, “FDA need only show that the factors outlined in the CPG for determining 
compounding are a reasonable basis upon which to initiate an inspection under 
the FDCA.”86 According to the Third Circuit, even though Section 503A was 
replaced by FDA-created guidelines of the 2002 CPG, FDA still had legitimate 
authority to inspect compounding pharmacies if it suspected the manufacturing 
of drugs.87 
Although Wedgewood was decided in 2005—three years before the Fifth 
Circuit split from the Ninth Circuit—Wedgewood reveals an important concept: 
the Third Circuit Court was willing to give great deference to FDA when the 
issue concerned drugs since the FDCA gives FDA oversight of all drugs.88 If 
Wedgewood was decided post-Fifth and Ninth Circuit split, the decision most 
likely would not have changed due to the Court’s reliance on FDA’s expertise. 
It was inconsequential whether or not Section 503A was valid because the Court 
 
 81. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(1) (2006). 
 82. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 83. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(1) (2006) (stating that in order for an inspection officer to enter and inspect a 
facility, he/she shall present with proper credentials and a written notice for the owner of the facility). 
 84. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 8; see also HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 6 (noting that “FDA has consistently asserted authority over compounding pharmacies engaged in ac-
tivities more analogous to those of a drug manufacturer”). 
 85. Wedgewood Vill. Pharm., Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 263, 270 (3rd Cir. 2005). 
 86. Id. at 272–73. 
 87. Id. Wedgewood Pharmacy was suspected and found to be manufacturing instead of compounding 
because “Wedgewood’s operations exceeded those of a retail pharmacy.” Id. at 265–66. These activities 
included producing drug products in large amounts without patient-specific prescriptions, purchasing an 
encapsulation machine that is used for large-scale drug manufacturing, and purchasing bulk quantities of 
substances that exceeded the usual amount for a retail pharmacy. Id. at 265. 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 81, 85. 
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held that the 2002 CPG was highly indicative of FDA’s role in regulating phar-
macies that were acting like manufacturers.89 In the First Circuit, where NECC 
was located, FDA most likely had the authority to inspect NECC without much 
difficulty. However, FDA was conflicted, hesitant, and perhaps even apprehen-
sive about the consequences of taking action in a split landscape between the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits.90 
B. Post-DQSA: FDA Has Explicitly Clear Authority Over Large-Scale 
Compounding 
The NECC incident underscored the need for clear authority and defined 
roles. Although FDA had the authority to inspect and enforce action on NECC, 
there remained enough doubt to deter the agency from taking decisive action.91 
FDA needed and wanted explicit authority, such as requiring facilities like 
NECC to register with FDA to clearly place NECC under FDA oversight.92 In 
response to the NECC scandal, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg ada-
mantly declared, “[W]e must do everything we can to clarify and strengthen 
FDA’s authority in this area. We recommend that Congress recognize the appro-
priate state role in regulation of traditional compounding while authorizing clear 
and appropriate Federal standards and oversight needed for non-traditional com-
pounders that produce riskier products.”93 All the events leading up to 2012 im-
pelled Congress to pass the DQSA, which unequivocally delegates oversight of 
large-scale compounding to FDA.94 
The DQSA generally amends the FDCA in two parts: Title I, the “Com-
pounding Quality Act” (“CQA”) and Title II, the “Drug Supply Chain Act” 
(“DSCSA”).95 This note analyzes only Title I of the DQSA. Title II addresses 
the need for electronically tracking drug products within the supply chain to ul-
timately deter and prevent “counterfeit, stolen, contaminated, or otherwise harm-
ful” drug products being exposed to consumers,96 and is beyond the scope of the 
topic for this note. 
 
 89. Wedgewood, 421 F.3d at 272–73. 
 90. See supra notes 71, 80. 
 91. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 92. Meningitis Outbreak 2013 House Hearing (statement of Margaret A. Hamburg, Commissioner, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin.), supra note 71, at 30 (“[D]espite the ambiguities and the split court decision, 
compounding pharmacies are not required to register with [FDA], so we don’t know who they are and 
what they are making.”). 
 93. Id. at 24. 
 94. T.R. Goldman, Health Policy Brief: Regulating Compounding Pharmacies, HEALTH AFF., May 
1, 2014, at 2, 3 (describing that the NECC crisis prompted “several rounds of both House and Senate 
committee hearings”). 
 95. Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.). 
 96. Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,  
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugIntegrityandSupplyChainSecurity/DrugSupplyChain Secu-
rityAct/default.htm(last updated Feb. 29, 2016). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360eee (2013). 
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Section 503A, which has minor changes from the DQSA,97 addresses tra-
ditional pharmacy compounding, in which a drug product is compounded on an 
individual basis.98 Traditional compounding occurs when a licensed pharmacist 
at a licensed pharmacy mixes drug ingredients upon receipt of a valid prescrip-
tion for a specifically identified patient.99 The DQSA changes the FDCA by add-
ing Section 503B, creating a new category of an “outsourcing facility” focused 
on producing and distributing sterile compounds on a larger scale.100 An out-
sourcing facility differs from a traditional 503A compounding pharmacy in that 
an outsourcing facility does not need to be a licensed pharmacy nor does it have 
to compound on an individual basis.101 The only vestige of traditional pharmacy 
that remains is the need for a licensed pharmacist to be present in the facility, 
supervising the on-site compounding.102 With the passage of the DQSA, this note 
turns to an examination of FDA guidance documents to determine whether the 
issues of jurisdiction and FDA authority have actually been resolved. 
1. FDA Guidance Defines and Clarifies Its Direct Authority over 
Outsourcing Facilities 
There are several guidance documents available manifesting FDA’s appar-
ent authority over outsourcing facilities.103 Of these, there are three separate 
guidelines just on the topic of registering as an outsourcing facility. One de-
scribes the process of registration,104 another describes the fees associated with 
registration and inspection,105 and the third outlines how an entity should decide 
whether to register as an outsourcing facility in the first place.106 FDA makes 
very clear that once an entity registers as an outsourcing facility, FDA will have 
complete oversight. 
 
 97. See supra note 44.   
 98. 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2013). 
 99. 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2013); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 100. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(d)(4)(A) (2013). 
 101. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(d)(4)(A)(ii) (2013) (defining an “outsourcing facility” as a facility that “has 
elected to register as an outsourcing facility”) (emphasis added); 21 U.S.C. §353b(d)(4)(C) (2013) (“An 
outsourcing facility may or may not obtain prescriptions for identified individual patients.”). 
 102. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(a) (2013). 
 103. Regulatory Policy Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ Drugs/Guid-
anceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm166743.htm (last visited April 24, 
2016). 
 104. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REGISTRATION OF HUMAN DRUG 
COMPOUNDING OUTSOURCING FACILITIES UNDER SECTION 503B OF THE FD&C ACT (Nov. 2014). 
 105. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FEES FOR HUMAN DRUG COMPOUNDING 
OUTSOURCING FACILITIES UNDER SECTIONS 503B AND 744K OF THE FD&C ACT (Nov. 2014). 
 106. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR ENTITIES CONSIDERING WHETHER TO REGISTER AS 
OUTSOURCING FACILITIES UNDER SECTION 503B OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 
(Aug. 2015) [hereinafter WHETHER TO REGISTER GUIDANCE]. 
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An outsourcing facility is an entity in one geographic location that com-
pounds sterile drugs, chooses to register as an outsourcing facility, and complies 
with the requirements of the provision.107 An outsourcing facility does not need 
to register as a pharmacy or obtain prescriptions for individual patients.108 Once 
registered with FDA, an outsourcing facility is subject to FDA inspection.109 If 
an entity decides not to register as an outsourcing facility and does not meet the 
criteria of a traditional pharmacy, FDA will identify it as a conventional drug 
manufacturer and subject that entity to the registration requirements and other 
conditions for such activity under FDCA.110 Section 503B makes it clear that 
FDA has authority over outsourcing facilities and manufacturers, while the state 
retains authority over traditional pharmacies and traditional compounding de-
fined by Section 503A.111 
III.  STERILE COMPOUNDING STANDARDS 
Before the DQSA, regulatory jurisdiction was not the only inconsistent as-
pect of drug compounding; standards for actual procedures and processing of 
drug compounding were also inconsistent. There were no national standards for 
sterile compounding. This section compares the standards that existed pre-DQSA 
and post-DQSA in order to demonstrate why the current, more stringent stand-
ards promulgated by FDA for outsourcing facilities are superior and can lead to 
more uniform drug production. 
A. Pre-DQSA: Lack of Uniform Standards Made It Difficult to Enforce Proper 
Sterile Compounding, Allowing Pharmacies to Practice Compounding 
According to Their Arbitrary Discretion 
The regulation of compounding hinged on differentiating between com-
pounding from manufacturing by looking at Section 503A of the FDCA or the 
nine-factored test of the 2002 CPG.112 When it came to the actual act of sterile 
compounding, the only recognizable standards that existed before the DQSA 
were the guidelines created by the United States Pharmacopeia (“USP”), titled 
Chapter 797 (“USP 797”).113 USP is a non-governmental organization that spe-
 
 107. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(d)(4)(A) (2013). 
 108. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(d)(4)(B)–(C) (2013). 
 109. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(b)(4)(A)(i) (2013); see also 21 U.S.C. § 374 (2006). 
 110. WHETHER TO REGISTER GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 4 n.23. 
 111. Id. Section 503A (describing minimal changes); see supra note 44. 
 112. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 113. The first version of USP <797> became official in 2004. It was last revised in 2008. USP finished 
its latest revisions in 2015, and posted the proposed provisions for public review by January 31, 2016. 
Frequently Asked Questions: <797> Pharmaceutical Compounding—Sterile Preparations, U.S. 
PHARMACOPEIAL CONVENTION, http://www.usp.org/frequently-asked-questions/pharmaceutical-com-
pounding-sterile-preparations (last visited Jan. 1, 2016). 
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cializes in setting standards for medicine, food ingredients, and dietary supple-
ments.114 It lacks authority to enforce any of its standards, but any government 
entity at state or federal level can choose to incorporate USP standards into its 
laws and/or regulations.115 
In early 2013, fewer than half the states required pharmacies to comply with 
USP standards.116 Moreover, there was no uniform standard for education, train-
ing, and required experience level of state inspectors, leading to different inspec-
tion results of each compounding pharmacy depending on who the inspector was 
at that time.117 This could have led to discrepancies from pharmacy-to-pharmacy, 
engendering a dangerous situation since many health facilities relied on the ex-
pertise of state inspectors to make sure they were producing sterile and safe drug 
products in compliance with the governing laws.118 This also posed a problem 
when pharmacies were distributing across state borders.119 It was not safe to as-
sume that the home state board of pharmacy did an adequate inspection of that 
particular non-resident pharmacy.120 This created inconsistency in compounded 
drug products across the country. 
Massachusetts was one of the states that required compliance with USP 797 
for sterile compounding.121 However, NECC did not follow proper protocols out-
lined by USP 797, resulting in violations such as improper autoclaving, which 
compromised the sterility of its products, dirty powder hoods that protected phar-
macists from inhaling harmful substances while compounding, and a leaking 
 
 114. About USP, U.S. PHARMACOPEIAL CONVENTION, http://www.usp.org/about-usp (last visited Jan. 
1, 2016). 
 115. Joseph V. Pergolizzi, Jr. et al., Compounding Pharmacies: Who is in Charge?, 13 PAIN PRAC. 
253, 254 (2013). 
 116. Besu F. Teshome et al., How Gaps in Regulation of Compounding Pharmacy Set the Stage for a 
Multistate Fungal Meningitis Outbreak, 54 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N. 441, 444 (2014) (noting that a 
2013 survey found only twenty-three states requiring full compliance with USP <797>). 
 117. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AM. SOC. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM., AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, STERILE 
COMPOUNDING SUMMIT: SUMMARY OF A STAKEHOLDER MEETING 10, 14 (Feb. 6, 2013) (expressing con-
cern over the inadequate education, training, and experience of state board of pharmacy inspectors that 
lead to varying compounding practices state-by-state). 
 118. See id. at 14 (noting that hospitals rely on thorough state boards of pharmacy inspections because 
hospitals “often lack resources or expertise to inspect compounding pharmacies themselves”). 
 119. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 25–26 (noting that state oversight of pharmacy 
compounding varied depending on “each state’s regulations and the resources each state devotes to licens-
ing and inspecting its pharmacies,” where some state budgets could not cover the resources needed to have 
qualified inspectors to inspect pharmacies thoroughly and frequently, compromising the quality of inspec-
tions). 
 120. See id. at 25 (recognizing that the “frequency of pharmacy inspections and the qualifications of 
the pharmacy inspectors vary widely among states, and it is uncertain whether all nonresident pharmacies 
receive adequate oversight from their home states”). 
 121. Lloyd K. Jessen, Iowa Board of Pharmacy, Nat’l Assoc. Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) 2012 Tri-
athlon Interactive Executive Officer Forum: Compounding—What Is Manufacturing? What is Com-
pounding? (Nov. 13–14, 2012). 
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boiler that was forming a pool of water around it.122 There were visible black 
particulates in sealed vials of steroid compounds prepared by NECC.123 Before 
the DQSA, USP standards were futile because even when states like Massachu-
setts required USP compliance, no regulatory body was enforcing these stand-
ards, allowing pharmacies like NECC to practice compounding according to 
their own discretion. Unsupervised compounding amplified the precarious back-
drop already set in place by unregulated compounding. 
B. Post-DQSA: Uniform Standards for Sterile Compounding Will Create 
Consistently Safe Drug Products 
USP 797 was not enough and will never be enough in its current form124 
for large-scale sterile compounding and that is why the DQSA is necessary.125 
With its redefined authority from the DQSA, FDA requires outsourcing facilities 
to comply with Current Good Manufacturing Practice (“CGMP”) standards, 
which are overall more comprehensive and rigorous than USP 797.126 This sec-
tion goes into greater detail about specific parts of FDA guidance regarding 
CGMP requirements to demonstrate how CGMPs are more appropriate than USP 
797 for large-scale sterile compounding. 
1. CGMP is the Minimum Standard Outsourcing Facilities Should Use to 
Develop Their Best Practices 
In its July 2014 interim draft guidance, FDA established minimum stand-
ards for sterile compounding done by outsourcing facilities based on CGMPs.127 
Looking at the guidance in its totality, the purpose of adapting CGMPs for out-
sourcing facilities seems to be creating an infallible and almost innate system 
 
 122. COMMONWEALTH OF MA. EXEC. OFFICE OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. DEP’T OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH, NEW ENGLAND COMPOUNDING CENTER (NECC) PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FINDINGS, at 
4–5 (2012). 
 123. Id. at 4. 
 124. USP’s proposed revisions to Chapter 797 was published for public commenting on November 2, 
2015 and closed on January 31, 2016. One of the major changes recognizes that all sterile compounds 
should be carefully prepared because “no sterile compounding is inherently ‘low risk.’” General Chapter 
<797> Pharmaceutical Compounding—Sterile Preparations Notice of Intent to Revise, USP (Sept. 25, 
2015), http://www.usp.org/usp-nf/notices/general-chapter-797-proposed-revision. 
 125. ERIC S. KASTANGO & KATHERINE H. DOUGLASS, CLINICAL IQ LLC, QUALITY STANDARDS FOR 
LARGE SCALE STERILE COMPOUNDING FACILITIES 11 (2014). 
 126. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 127. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CURRENT GOOD MANUFACTURING 
PRACTICE—INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN DRUG COMPOUNDING OUTSOURCING FACILITIES UNDER 
SECTIONS 503B OF THE FD&C ACT (Jul. 2014) [hereinafter CGMP GUIDANCE]. 
   
310 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 19:293 
that can be used on a routine basis in order to guarantee sterility and high-quality 
products.128 
CGMPs were created to serve as a minimum set of standards for imple-
menting quality systems and risk management to “assure[] the identity, strength, 
quality, and purity of drug products by requiring manufacturers of pharmaceuti-
cals adequately control their manufacturing operations.”129 CGMPs have been 
adopted internationally and represent a way to standardize manufacturing of so 
that each drug product put on the market by any manufacturing company is reli-
ably safe and effective for consumer use.130 Unlike the manufacturing of com-
mercial drugs, compounding never had a uniform national standard before the 
DQSA.131 As mentioned before, some states required USP 797 compliance, but 
state-level enforcement of these standards was not always reliable.132 
Moreover, USP 797 has always been meant for traditional small-scale com-
pounding.133 When it comes to large-scale compounding where one batch may 
affect multiple patients, the production process needs tighter limits and surveil-
lance methods in order to minimize the risk of contamination.134 Thus, the inten-
tion of applying CGMPs to outsourcing facility compounding is similar to man-
ufacturing: to establish comprehensive and rigorous standards for the production 
of safe and sterile compounded drugs suitable for widespread use. 
FDA’s interim guidance for CGMP requirements (“cCGMPs”) is specifi-
cally customized for sterile compounding prepared by outsourcing facilities.135 
The main purpose of the interim guidance is the “assurance of sterile drug prod-
ucts and the safety of compounded drug products . . . .”136 The goal for sterile 
and safe drug production is the same for USP 797, but it differs from cCGMPs 
in terms of what should be emphasized when a compounding facility develops 
 
 128. KASTANGO & DOUGLASS, supra note 125, at 11 (relating large scale compounding to manufac-
turing where “[s]ystematic evaluation and elimination of variability within a manufacturing process is a 
cornerstone of predictable quality outcomes”). 
 129. Facts About Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMPs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN.,http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Manufacturing/ucm169105.htm (last 
updated Jan. 6, 2015). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra Part III.A. 
 132. See supra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
 133. This may change when the revised USP is released. See infra note 125. 
 134. KASTANGO & DOUGLASS, supra note 125, at 10 (noting the importance of “robust quality assur-
ance practices, such as those described under CGMPs” because the resulting drug products from large-
scale compounding “reach hundreds of patients across the country”). 
 135. CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 2 (“This interim guidance reflects FDA’s intent to recog-
nize the differences between compounding outsourcing facilities and conventional drug manufacturers, 
and to tailor CGMP requirements to the nature of the specific compounding operations conducted by 
outsourcing facilities . . . .”). 
 136. Id. at 3. 
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its best practices. The following subsections describe some key differences be-
tween USP 797 and cCGMPs. 
a.  Identity and Quality of Components Best Practices 
The identity and quality of ingredients directly affects the integrity of a 
sterile compounded drug. It is essential to start with proper components137 be-
cause if the components are compromised from the beginning, then the process 
may be delayed or result in a product that is not safe for patient consumption. 
One of the more prominent differences between cCGMPs and USP 797 is the 
standard of ensuring identity, strength, quality, and purity for every drug produc-
tion. USP 797 has no specific guidance on confirming the identity and quality of 
components,138 while cCGMPs detail and emphasize the importance of having 
control over the source and quality of all components, including non-sterile ma-
terials or other ingredients used to compound sterile drugs.139 
Regarding the quality of ingredients used in a compound, USP 797 gener-
ally states: “Compounding personnel ascertain that ingredients for [compounded 
sterile preparations] are of the correct identity and appropriate quality using the 
following information: vendor labels, labeling, certificates of analysis, direct 
chemical analysis, and knowledge of compounding facility storage condi-
tions.”140 In contrast, cCGMPs expand on each of those criteria and more. 
First, specifications of the components of a particular compound must be 
predetermined.141 These specifications equate to the finished compounded prod-
uct’s quality, which include identity, strength, purity, particle size, sterility, and 
bacterial endotoxin level.142 Then, each batch of components needs to be tested 
and verified for its alleged identity.143 However, FDA will not enforce such test-
ing if before use, the component is an approved finished drug product obtained 
directly from a FDA-registered manufacturer, labeled appropriately, verified as 
compliant with the required specifications, and shipped in an intact package with 
a valid receipt.144 
Testing can be waived if there is a Certificate of Analysis (“COA”) from 
the supplier.145 The problem with a COA is that if the supplier only repackages 
 
 137. Components consist of bulk active ingredients, excipients, and other ingredients, but not finished 
drugs. Id. at 9 n.12. 
 138. KASTANGO & DOUGLASS, supra note 125, at 19. 
 139. CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 8–9. 
 140. U.S. PHARMACOPEIA, 2012 USP 35/NF 30: USP-NF GENERAL CHAPTER <797> 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOUNDING—STERILE PREPARATIONS 20 (2011) [hereinafter USP CHAPTER 797] 
 141. CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 8. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. All of these conditions must be met to be exempt from FDA inspection. Id. at 8–9. 
 145. Id. at 9. 
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components, they are not required to do specific qualitative testing and/or eval-
uation of their components.146 Thus, a COA may not be a true testament of a 
component’s quality. To accommodate for this discrepancy, the guidance states 
that a COA is acceptable only when it comes from a supplier whose reliability 
has been proven at appropriate intervals147 and at least one identity test has con-
firmed the component.148 However, recognizing the potential redundancy of this 
requirement, FDA requested public comments on alternatives “that would enable 
an outsourcing facility to have confidence in the quality of incoming components 
without periodic laboratory testing following initial qualification testing to con-
firm the information in the supplier’s [COA].”149 
To gauge the opinions of its relevant constituents,  FDA suggested a spe-
cific alternative within its interim guidance. The alternative consists of differen-
tiating between a supplier who is the original manufacturer of a component and 
a supplier who is not.150 Under this approach, a supplier who is not the original 
manufacturer would be required to submit a drug master file (“DMF”) that de-
scribes in detail the qualitative tests and assurances of the component, have the 
DMF approved by FDA, commit to updating the DMF accordingly, provide a 
copy of the DMF to the purchasing outsourcing facility, and give notice of any 
changes in the component’s quality to the purchasers.151 In the event that an out-
sourcing facility wants to use DMFs in lieu of testing requirements, it must notify  
FDA of those intentions.152 
Under FDA’s approach to reduce superfluous quality testing of compo-
nents, non-manufacturer suppliers will indirectly be held to higher and stricter 
standards of quality assurance.153 This will allow outsourcing facilities to be con-
fident when purchasing components. However, it may not be so well-received 
by suppliers who may need to configure new systems and best practices of their 
own in order to become reliable sources of components. This alternative can have 
several consequences, including filtering out suppliers who cannot afford the re-
sources necessary to comply with DMF requirements, leaving only manufacturer 
suppliers to sell components. Assuming a steady demand of compounded prod-
ucts with fewer suppliers, prices of components can increase and in effect in-
crease the price of the finished compounded product. 
 
 146. KASTANGO & DOUGLASS, supra note 125, at 19. 
 147. For example, a supplier demonstrates its reliability through appropriate procedures and tests at 
least annually for active ingredients and every two years for other components. CGMP GUIDANCE, supra 
note 127, at 9. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 10. 
 150. Id. at 10–11. 
 151. Id. at 11. 
 152. Id. at 10. 
 153. See supra text accompanying note 151. 
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b.  Production and Process Best Practices 
Personnel education and training is the most important, but limiting factor 
for sterile processing and production of compounded drugs. Although USP 797 
updated their standards in 2008 placing more emphasis on personnel training and 
evaluation, 154 it “lack[s] the qualitative and quantitative specificity and rigor 
needed for large-scale compounding operations.”155 cCGMPs prove to be better 
standards for outsourcing facilities because these expect a higher level of person-
nel training, which in effect will help to produce higher quality drug production. 
Both USP 797 and cCGMPs recommend testing personnel for proper tech-
nique and behavior with a media fill simulation.156 USP 797 outlines a media fill 
simulation in a non-specific way: “Media-fill tests shall represent the most chal-
lenging or stressful conditions actually encountered by personnel being evalu-
ated when they prepare . . . [compounded sterile preparations].”157 cCGMPs de-
scribe “media fill studies” to “closely simulate aseptic manufacturing operations 
incorporating, as appropriate, worst-case activities and conditions that provide a 
challenge to aseptic operations.”158 cGMPs go on to list several challenges that 
should be addressed in the simulation, such as the number of personnel and ac-
tivities, shift or garbing changes, equipment assembly and manipulation issues, 
and other processing issues.159 Moreover, each individual needs to pass at least 
three successive simulations in order to be qualified to conduct aseptic opera-
tions.160 
cCGMPs go beyond USP 797’s general recommendation that personnel 
should be trained “conscientiously and skillfully” and “maintain a formal educa-
tion, training, and competency assessment program that encompasses all the 
functions and tasks addressed.”161 cCGMPs view personnel as active participants 
of a compounding facility. The interim guidance suggests a systematic approach 
that consists of routine (daily or every shift change) monitoring of gloves and 
gowns during operations, establishing limits based on the contamination risk of 
a product, and investigating results that are abnormal, inconsistent, adverse, or 
in excess of the prescribed limits.162 
 
 154. Cheryl A. Thompson, USP Releases Revision of Chapter on Sterile Compounding, 65 AM. J. 
HEALTH-SYST. PHARMACY 104, 104 (2008). 
 155. KASTANGO & DOUGLASS, supra note 125, at 23 (comparing the minimum garbing requirements 
between USP 797 and CGMPs to note that USP 797 “does not provide any qualitative guidance on this 
topic,” whereas CGMPs specifically state that personnel “may not have any exposed skin” in aseptic pro-
cessing areas and “must be vigilant about how they move and work within the critical filling zones”). 
 156. USP CHAPTER 797, supra note 140, at 18; CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 14. 
 157. USP CHAPTER 797, supra note 140, at 18. 
 158. CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 14 (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 12. 
 161. USP CHAPTER 797, supra note 140, at 7, 24. 
 162. CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 6–7. 
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This last criterion of investigating abnormalities seems to emphasize that 
personnel need to be active and alert at all times. Even the media fill studies are 
designed around “worst-case scenarios” and not just “challenging or stressful 
conditions” to evaluate an individual’s awareness and attentiveness.163  Person-
nel should not only be able to consistently produce sterile compounds, but also 
consistently detect deviations from the prescribed best practices and resolve them 
in a timely fashion.164 Betterment can only be processed and performed by peo-
ple, not automated machinery. Calling for personnel who are well trained, skill-
ful, and mindful will make these best practices successful and enduring. 
c.  Release Testing Best Practices 
Release testing is another area where USP 797 and cCGMPs diverge. Be-
fore a finished sterile compounded product is released for distribution, it needs 
to be tested once more to confirm at a minimum: its identity, strength, stability, 
and the presence of visible particles and bacterial endotoxins.165 Of the criteria 
for release testing, the protocol for stability testing is one of the major differences 
between USP 797 and cCGMPs. 
Stability testing is performed to determine and assign the appropriate expi-
ration date or beyond-use date (“BUD”) of the final product.166 According to 
USP 797, “BUDs . . . are usually assigned on the basis of professional experi-
ence . . . BUDs for [compounded sterile preparations] are rarely based on prepa-
ration-specific chemical assay results” like those used for commercially manu-
factured drug products.167 Instead, USP 797 prescribes BUDs according to the 
level of contamination risk of a compound: immediate use, low-risk, medium-
risk, and high-risk.168 Immediate use is a product that needs to be used within 
one hour after the product has begun compounding and is exempt from BUD 
requirements in USP 797 due to its urgent need.169 High-risk includes using non-
sterile components to compound a sterile compound or putting sterile products 
into a non-sterile container.170 High-risk products have a BUD of 24 hours at 
room temperature, three days in the refrigerator, and 45 days in the freezer.171 
All other sterile products fall along the spectrum according to the professional 
judgment of personnel and/or the outsourcing facility.172 
 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 157–158. 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 157–164. 
 165. CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 14–15, 18. 
 166. Id. at 18. 
 167. USP CHAPTER 797, supra note 140, at 22. 
 168. Id. at 4, 7. 
 169. Urgent situations include “cardiopulmonary resuscitation, emergency room treatment, [and] 
preparation of diagnostic agents.” Id. at 7. 
 170. Id. at 6. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 4–6. 
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cCGMPs leave no room for professional discretion in determining BUDs. 
If a final product is terminally sterilized173 without release testing, the product 
must have a BUD of 14 days or less.174 If the final product was aseptically pro-
cessed175 without release testing, the product can only have a BUD of twenty-
four hours at USP controlled room temperature, three days refrigerated, and/or 
forty-five days in a solid frozen state.176 This BUD also applies to batches of ten 
or less dosage units.177 If the final product completes release testing, the BUD 
can be extended up to fourteen days at USP controlled room temperature or re-
frigerated or forty-five days in a solid frozen state. 178 Completing release testing 
affords the longest BUD.179 Compared to USP 797, FDA recommends simplified 
but stricter parameters for BUD assignment.180 
The more stringent protocol may be burdensome for outsourcing facilities 
that compound smaller batches containing ten or fewer units. This becomes even 
more controversial when it comes to compounding a prescription-based order. If 
two identical low-risk compounds181 pursuant to an individual prescription are 
produced—one by an outsourcing facility following cCGMPs and the other by a 
traditional pharmacy following USP 797—the BUD for the compound made by 
the outsourcing facility would be twenty-four hours at room temperature and the 
BUD for the compound made by the traditional pharmacy would be forty-eight 
hours at room temperature.182 Outsourcing facilities may find it unfair that they 
must abide by stricter limits, while traditional pharmacies under Section 503A 
are able to compound the same types of prescription-based orders without such 
constraints.183 FDA will need to address how it will reconcile these differences 
 
 173. Terminal sterilization is the process of sterilizing the finished drug product in its sealed container 
“under high-quality environmental conditions” such as heat or irradiation. In contrast, an aseptic process 
consists of sterilizing the drug product, container, and closure separately then assembled together. U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: STERILE DRUG PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY ASEPTIC 
PROCESSING—CURRENT GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE 2 (Sept. 2004). 
 174. CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 18. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 18. 
 177. Id. at 15. “One dosage unit is the amount of drug in a labeled dose, e.g., one tablet or one syringe.” 
Id. at 15, n.14. 
 178. The BUD begins after completion of release testing. Id. at 18. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 168–171, 174–178. 
 181. An example of a low-risk compound according to USP standards would be the reconstitution 
(mixing a powdered drug with liquid) of an antibiotic then injecting the reconstituted drug into an IV bag. 
USP CHAPTER 797, supra note 140, at 5. 
 182. Compare CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 18 with USP CHAPTER 797, supra note 140, at 
5. 
 183. Traditional compounding under Section 503A are not subject to CGMPs. 21 U.S.C. § 353a(a) 
(2013). 
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and clarify how it will differentiate outsourcing facilities from traditional phar-
macies as to not undermine their purpose and limit their operations.184 
2. Mandatory Adverse Event Reporting Places Accountability on 
Outsourcing Facilities 
Post-market safety surveillance of any type of drug is crucial to continued 
protection of consumer health. Manufacturers are required to send safety reports 
to FDA through MedWatch.185 Individual consumers and health care providers 
can voluntarily report any safety issues to FDA as well.186 Before the DQSA, 
FDA only knew about adverse events related to compounded products if and 
when these events were voluntarily reported.187 With the passage of the DQSA, 
adverse event reporting (“AER”) now also applies to outsourcing facilities, plac-
ing accountability and liability on their productions.188 
An “adverse drug experience” is an undesirable occurrence “associated 
with the use of [a] compounded . . . product” in a health care setting, including 
overdose, drug abuse, drug withdrawal, or when the drug does not work as ex-
pected.189 A “serious adverse drug experience” is a more heightened situation in 
which the drug results in a life-threatening event that may require hospitalization 
or results in death.190 An “unexpected adverse drug experience” is an event not 
 
 184. FDA recognizes that a traditional pharmacy and an outsourcing facility may have overlapping 
operations. However, FDA adamantly states that any compound produced in an outsourcing facility must 
be made under CGMP requirements regardless of whether the same compound can be made under USP 
conditions in a traditional pharmacy. Traditional pharmacy under Section 503A and outsourcing facility 
under Section 503B must be distinctly separate to “prevent commingling of compounding activities” and 
protect public health by “ensur[ing] that those obtaining the drugs will know the standards under which 
they were compounded.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FACILITY 
DEFINITION UNDER SECTION 503B OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 4–5 (Apr. 2016) 
[hereinafter FACILITY DEFINITION GUIDANCE]. 
 185. Questions and Answers on FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ Surveillance/Ad-
verseDrugEffects/default.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2016); see also MedWatch: The FDA Safety Infor-
mation and Adverse Event Reporting Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/default.htm (last updated Apr. 20, 2016); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80(c), 
803.30, 803.50 (2015). 
 186. Questions and Answers on FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surv-eillance/Ad-
verseDrugEffects/default.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2016). 
 187. GAO COMPOUNDING REPORT, supra note 6, at 16. 
 188. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(b)(5). 
 189. 21 C.F.R. § 310.305(b) (2015). 
 190. Id. Specifically, any adverse drug experience refers to an event that occurs at any dose and results 
in any of the following: life-threatening experience or death, hospitalization, significant disability or in-
capacity, or congenital anomaly or birth defect. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING FOR OUTSOURCING FACILITIES UNDER SECTIONS 503B OF THE FEDERAL 
FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 4 (Oct. 2015) [hereinafter AER GUIDANCE]. 
 2018] DRUG QUALITY AND THE SECURITY ACT OF 2013 317 
found on the labeling of the final product – a rare or never before observed ex-
perience associated with the drug.191 Outsourcing facilities are required to report 
all unexpected adverse experiences and are strongly encouraged to report all se-
rious adverse experiences.192 Reports must be made within fifteen days of first 
receiving the information of the adverse event and must be followed by prompt 
investigation and a follow-up report, if necessary, within fifteen days of receiv-
ing any new information.193 All records and reports need to be kept for ten years, 
readily accessible to FDA during inspection or when asked.194 
The standard for adverse drug experience reporting is now the same for 
outsourcing facilities and manufacturers and is under the direct supervision of 
FDA.195 This should compel outsourcing facilities to develop best practices that 
include regular reevaluation of their procedures for sterile compounding and in-
tegration of a recalling system. Accountability is now fundamental to becoming 
an outsourcing facility. 
IV. OTHER ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 
The DQSA is not perfect; no law ever is. The DQSA’s success will depend 
on how FDA takes possession of its unmistakable authority over outsourcing fa-
cilities. In its nascence, there are several issues that need to be addressed. One 
issue previously discussed is the need for FDA to reconcile the differences of 
regulating traditional pharmacies and outsourcing facilities, especially when 
both entities overlap in their operations.196 This part of the note will explore other 
prominent issues brought to light as FDA is implementing the DQSA: how FDA 
will ultimately tailor CGMP requirements to outsourcing facilities without dis-
advantaging manufacturers’ CGMP requirements and how FDA will cooperate 
with states in order to facilitate the harmonious coexistence of the DQSA and 
local laws. Lastly, all issues and criticisms aside, this part will look at how out-
sourcing facilities have the potential to alleviate critical drug shortages. 
A.  CGMP Compliance: Large-Scale Compounding vs. Manufacturing 
There is criticism that a new class of drug distributors is unnecessary for 
better regulation of large-scale drug compounding because outsourcing facilities 
are basically bound to the same CGMP requirements as manufacturers.197 Critics 
argue that outsourcing facilities should not be given a more lenient version of 
 
 191. 21 C.F.R. § 310.305(b) (2015). 
 192. AER GUIDANCE, supra note 190, at 5. 
 193. 21 U.S.C. § 310.305(c) (2015). 
 194. AER GUIDANCE, supra note 190, at 10. 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 185, 188. 
 196. See supra Part III.B.1.c. 
 197. See supra Part III.B. 
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CGMPs just because they are “compounding” and not “manufacturing,” espe-
cially since both processes result in the creation of a drug.198 However, this is 
only partially true. While both compounding and manufacturing result in a 
“drug,” the two processes each have a different purpose199—a distinction FDA 
should consider when finalizing its CGMP guidance for outsourcing facilities. 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), an 
organization that represents pharmaceutical manufacturers, is one of the oppo-
nents of the creation of a third class of drug distributors.200 PhRMA argues that 
both compounders and manufacturers should be held to the same high standards 
of drug production.201 When the DQSA directs outsourcing facilities to comply 
with CGMP requirements, Congress clearly intended compounds to be regulated 
like manufactured drugs; having a separate category of drug distributors is re-
dundant.202 
Public Citizen’s Health Research Group (“Public Citizen”), a non-profit 
consumer rights advocacy group, agrees that a third category only undermines 
the strict legal standards that have been in place for conventional manufacturers 
for many years.203 Outsourcing facilities will have a lenient version of federal 
requirements (i.e. exemption from pre-market approval requirements) when both 
compounds and manufactured drug products pose similar risks of safety and ef-
ficacy.204 Public Citizen worries that this second-tier manufacturing will only 
stimulate the growth of substandard drug manufacturing.205 Instead of having 
this in-between category of drug distributors, Public Citizen agrees with PhRMA 
 
 198. Reforming the Drug Compounding Regulatory Framework: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On 
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 82 (2013) [hereinafter Reforming Drug 
Compounding Regulation 2013 House Hearing] (statement of Jeffrey K. Francer, Assistant General Coun-
sel, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America) (“Large-scale, commercial manufacturing of 
prescription medicines . . . should be governed by the same high standards as biopharmaceutical manu-
facturing—whether the producer is designated as a ‘pharmacy’ or as a ‘manufacturer.’”); see also Reform-
ing Drug Compounding Regulation 2013 House Hearing (statement of David Sterrett, Health Care Coun-
sel, Public Citizen’s Health Research Group), supra note 198, at 154 (“All drug manufacturers 
[commercial and compounding] should be held to the same standards.”). 
 199. See infra text accompanying notes 215–216. 
 200. See infra text accompanying notes 215–216. 
 201. Reforming Drug Compounding Regulation 2013 House Hearing (statement of Jeffrey K. Francer, 
Assistant General Counsel, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America), supra note 198, at 82 
(“The manufacturing of medicines, whether by manufacturers or pharmacies, should be regulated in a 
consistent, risk-based manner.”). 
 202. See id. at 82–83 (“Congress intended for large-scale, commercial production of medicines to be 
regulated by FDA applying cGMP standards”). 
 203. Mari Serebrov, PhRMA: Compounders Just Drugmakers by Another Name, BIOWORLD TODAY 
(July 17, 2013), http://www.bioworld.com/content/phrma-compounders-just-drugmakers-another-name-
0. 
 204. See id. (concurring that “[m]edicines that present similar risks should be regulated similarly”). 
 205. Id. 
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that this new category of an outsourcing facility is unnecessary and could result 
in further complications in federal and state regulation.206 
When it comes to the sterility and safety of drug products, redundancy does 
not seem to be an issue for FDA. FDA responded to PhRMA by giving the ex-
ample of hospitals that have relied on compounding pharmacies for their supply 
of sterile products that were previously made in-house.207 Compounding is a cru-
cial way to efficiently meet the specific health care needs of certain patients.208 
If compounding was subject to the same criteria as manufacturing a “new drug,” 
then it would be too time-consuming and defeat the purpose of providing the 
needed drug quickly. Whereas manufacturing does not have an imminent patient 
consumer, compounding (traditional or non-traditional) typically has a specific 
patient population waiting for or in need of the specific compound.209 
For FDA, the more relevant distinction seems to be between traditional and 
non-traditional compounding rather than between non-traditional compounding 
and manufacturing, as seen in Congressional testimonies leading up to the draft-
ing of the DQSA.210 It is important to separate traditional individual-based com-
 
 206. Reforming Drug Compounding Regulation 2013 House Hearing (statement of Jeffrey K. Francer, 
Assistant General Counsel, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America), supra note 198, at 80 
(arguing that a new category of compounders is unnecessary because it would “result in regulatory con-
fusion (both federal and state) and the application of different regulatory standards (and patient protec-
tions) for similar types of manufacturing”). 
 207. Reforming Drug Compounding Regulation 2013 House Hearing (statement of Janet Woodcock, 
Director Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.), supra note 198, at 27–8 
(recognizing that outsourcers provide a valuable service to hospitals that cannot compound in-house, such 
as “specialized dilutions of FDA-approved products” of surgery aesthetics); see also Charles E. Myers, 
History of Sterile Compounding in U.S. Hospitals: Learning From the Tragic Lessons of The Past, 70 AM. 
J. HEALTH-SYST. PHARM. 1414, 1417 (2013) (recognizing that there were many factors that contributed 
to hospitals outsourcing and in the 1980s, one of those reasons was the increased need for home infusion 
services upon a patient’s discharge while hospitals were unable to physically expand to meet the demands 
for sterile compounding, so patients were referred to compounding pharmacies for home infusion ser-
vices). 
 208. See infra Part IV.C. 
 209. See supra note 30; see also Charlotte Matheny & Caren McHenry Martin, Compounding Phar-
macy: Old Methods Finding a New Niche, 25 CONSULTANT PHARMACIST 357, 360 (2010) (describing 
specific patient populations who benefit from compounded drug products, such as pediatrics, geriatrics, 
those who cannot swallow, those with allergies to certain ingredients, and those who may need specific 
formulations unavailable commercially). 
 210. The Fungal Meningitis Outbreak: Could It Have Been Prevented? Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
On Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 47 (2012) 
(statement of Margaret A. Hamburg, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, U.S. Food & Drug Administra-
tion) (recommending distinctly that “the statute recognize two categories of compounding: traditional and 
non-traditional”); see also Meningitis Outbreak 2013 House Hearing, supra note 71, at 22 (reiterating that 
there needs to be a clear distinction between traditional and non-traditional compounding because non-
traditional compounding involves higher risks and thus should be regulated by FDA whereas traditional 
compounding has lower risks and thus can remain within State oversight); Reforming Drug Compounding 
Regulation 2013 House Hearing (statement of Janet Woodcock, Director Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.), supra note 198, at 34–35 (emphasizing that the main issue from 
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pounding from non-traditional large-scale compounding because the latter is as-
sociated with higher risks since its products have a higher chance of being ex-
posed to more people.211 Higher risks necessitate greater oversight that includes 
following CGMP standards like conventional drug manufacturers.212 In this 
sense, FDA seems to agree with PhRMA in that there is no significant difference 
between large-scale compounding and conventional manufacturing because both 
produce high-risk drug products traversing interstate commerce and should be 
subjected to stricter regulation.213 
Thus, an outsourcing facility should be regulated like a manufacturer be-
cause it should be held to the same high standards and best practices as a manu-
facturer. However, there is a major difference—outsourcing facilities do not pro-
duce new active ingredients; they work with already existing ingredients to 
compound them in a way that is needed or preferred for a specific patient or 
group of patients.214 Manufacturers formulate completely new drugs or generic 
versions from scratch, subject to the standards of safe and effective products.215 
Nowhere in the DQSA or FDA guidance documents does it state that a com-
pounded product must demonstrate its effectiveness in terms of how well it 
works for the intended indication. If the concern of a drug product is its effec-
tiveness, then that product falls under manufacturing territory. 
Outsourcing facilities should not be subject to pre-market requirements 
such as conducting clinical studies to prove a drug’s effectiveness in treating a 
certain disease or condition. FDA needs to create a final guidance on CGMPs for 
outsourcing facilities considering and differentiating each category of drug dis-
tributors by its individual purpose. Manufacturers create commercial drugs from 
scratch, outsourcing facilities customize compounded drugs with existing ingre-
dients, and traditional pharmacies dispense manufactured drugs and/or com-
pound for patient-specific orders. CGMPs for outsourcing facilities may be out-
lined more leniently compared to manufacturers, but FDA should not 
compromise on the rigor that CGMPs emphasize for drug process and produc-
tion. The interim guidance already manifests that FDA will preserve this strin-
gent approach to outsourcing facilities.216   
 
the beginning has been about “establish[ing] a bright line between State and Federal jurisdiction,” which 
separates small-scale individual-based from large-scale traversing interstate commerce compounding). 
 211. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
 212. Reforming Drug Compounding Regulation 2013 House Hearing (statement of Janet Woodcock, 
Director Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.), supra note 198, at 35 
(recognizing that the problem with large-scale compounding is that there are no standardized practices for 
aseptic compounding, such as CGMPs for conventional manufacturers). 
 213. See supra notes 198, 202 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 6. 
 215. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra text accompanying note 127. 
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B. Preemption Issues: State and Federal Governments Need to Collaborate 
Efficiently to Not Create Another Ineffective Statute 
An entity can voluntarily choose to register with FDA as an outsourcing 
facility and become subject to FDA regulation such as routine inspection, com-
pliance with cCGMPs, and reporting of adverse events.217 That same entity may 
need an additional license or registration to operate within the state of its resi-
dence.218 Furthermore, a state may only mandate USP 797 as the minimum sterile 
compounding standards.219 The fact that state and federal laws do not mirror each 
other may demonstrate complications and reignite jurisdictional issues of 
whether the state or FDA has oversight over a particular compounding entity. If 
the state and FDA do not cooperate effectively, the DQSA may end up being a 
futile attempt to smooth out the regulatory landscape. 
Unlike Title II of the DQSA,220 Title I does not explicitly state that it 
preempts all state standards and policies pertaining to large-scale compound-
ing.221 FDA does not clarify the issue either, but in its draft guidance on repack-
aging the agency does differentiate between a state-licensed pharmacy or federal 
facility and an outsourcing facility by establishing different requirements.222 
Whether FDA will keep these distinctions in other areas of DQSA implementa-
tion is unclear.223 
As for acknowledging the new category of drug distributors,224 as of Feb-
ruary 2016, only thirteen states require that an entity conducting sterile com-
pounding without a patient-specific prescription be registered with FDA as an 
outsourcing facility.225 Some states have already adopted the new category of an 
 
 217. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(b) (2013). 
 218. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 220. The Drug Supply Chain Security Act, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 599 (2013) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 360eee (2013)). 
 221. 21 U.S.C. § 360eee-4(b)(1) (2013). 
 222. For example, if a sterile drug product is repackaged in a state-licensed pharmacy or a federal 
facility, the repackaged product should have a BUD of at most thirty hours if stored at a USP controlled 
room temperature, at most 9 days if stored in a refrigerator, or at most forty-five days if stored in a solid 
frozen state. In contrast, if the sterile product is repackaged by an outsourcing facility, the product needs 
to first pass CGMP sterility testing before it can be assigned a specific BUD. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REPACKAGING OF CERTAIN HUMAN DRUG PRODUCTS BY PHARMACIES 
AND OUTSOURCING FACILITIES 6–8 (Feb. 2015) [hereinafter REPACKAGING GUIDANCE]. 
 223. But see supra note 184 (emphasizing the importance of separating traditional pharmacies, fol-
lowing most likely USP standards, from outsourcing facilities that must follow CGMP requirements). 
 224. For the purposes of this paper, there are three main “drug distributors”: 503A traditional phar-
macy, 503B outsourcing facility, and manufacturer. An outsourcing facility is the new category of drug 
distributors created by the DQSA. 
 225. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STATE OVERSIGHT OF STERILE DRUG 
COMPOUNDING 17 (2016) [hereinafter PEW REPORT]. 
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outsourcing facility, requiring a separate state license and/or registration.226 
Some states require that regardless of being federally registered as an outsourc-
ing facility, entities must register with the state as a pharmacy, manufacturer, or 
wholesaler, or both a manufacturer and a wholesaler.227 Several states remain 
undecided.228 This hodgepodge of requirements for state licensure and registra-
tion runs the risk of creating more confusion in a post-DQSA landscape of com-
pounding. This can prove challenging especially when compounds cross state 
borders: if one state requires an outsourcing facility to also be registered as a 
pharmacy and another state does not, an unregistered outsourcing facility that 
wants to do business in both states may be in a complicated (and perhaps expen-
sive) situation.229 
Although FDA has adapted CGMPs for outsourcing facilities, the fact that 
the repackaging guidance applies different standards to outsourcing facilities 
from state-licensed pharmacies manifests arbitrary discrepancy. The repackaging 
guidance specifically states that a state-licensed pharmacy should comply with 
USP 797 when repackaging a drug.230 However, the same guidance states that if 
the drug is repackaged in an outsourcing facility, it must be done in accordance 
with CGMP requirements.231 Similar to the issue of an outsourcing facility and a 
traditional pharmacy compounding prescription-based products,232 FDA needs 
to fully explain why outsourcing facilities are held to a higher standard besides 
the fact that the DQSA now requires outsourcing facilities to comply with 
CGMPs.233 
As illustrated by the pre-DQSA circuit split, complications turn into confu-
sion and chaos when there are different standards being applied across the coun-
try. Under the Supremacy Clause, the DQSA preempts all state laws, rules, and 
 
 226. These states are California, Delaware, Florida Idaho, Mississippi, New York, and Tennessee. id. 
at 15. 
 227. Id. at 15, 17. Title I of the DQSA states, “[a]n outsourcing facility is not required to be a licensed 
pharmacy,” which does not preclude an outsourcing facility from being a State-licensed pharmacy. 21 
U.S.C. § 353b(d)(4)(B) (2013). Moreover, Title I states that an outsourcing facility cannot sell its products 
to a wholesaler. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(a)(8) (2013). 
 228. PEW REPORT, supra note 225, at 17. 
 229. Id. at 15–16. 
 230. REPACKAGING GUIDANCE, supra note 222, at 7–8. 
 231. Id. at 8. 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 165–168. 
 233. Although the facility definition draft guidance recognizes operational overlaps and stresses the 
importance of keeping compounding standards for traditional pharmacies and outsourcing facilities sepa-
rate, the guidance does not fully explain why different standards must apply. The guidance only explains 
why a traditional pharmacy and an outsourcing facility should not operate at the same location or address 
due to the risk of sharing and mixing instruments, methods, and supplies that will make it “difficult to 
ensure that all of the products were made under the correct standards.” FACILITY DEFINITION GUIDANCE, 
supra note 184, at 4. 
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regulations regarding the existence and operation of an outsourcing facility.234 
Therefore, all states must require an entity compounding sterile drug products in 
large quantities to register as an outsourcing facility with FDA and be subject to 
FDA inspections. In order to do so, FDA first needs to form a strong partnership 
with the states so that each state recognizes outsourcing facilities in the same 
manner as the DQSA. Second, FDA and the states need to define what it means 
to become an outsourcing facility in terms of licensure and how this will affect 
shipping compounds across state borders. Third, FDA needs to address the dis-
crepancies that exist when outsourcing facilities and traditional pharmacies over-
lap in operations and are held to different standards.235 Finally, FDA and the 
states need to define how their partnership will stay in close communication and 
operate together to enforce effective regulation. FDA and state authorities need 
to work collaboratively and efficiently to make sure that the DQSA does not 
create another complicated regulatory landscape. 
C. Public Health Remedy: Outsourcing Facilities Have the Potential to 
Alleviate Drug Shortages 
Drug shortages are  multifaceted issues that impact patient care and difficult 
to resolve completely.236 The DQSA has the potential to help alleviate this prob-
lem by permitting outsourcing facilities to compound any drug that is on FDA’s 
drug shortage list.237 Outsourcing facilities can take advantage of this niche be-
cause they follow strict CGMP guidelines to produce high quality sterile prod-
ucts like manufacturers, but provide the products in quicker made-to-order fash-
ion like a traditional pharmacy.238 However, the success of outsourcing facilities 
 
 234. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
 235. See supra note 233. 
 236. List of current drug shortages according to FDA can be found at: http://www.ac-
cessdata.fda.gov/scripts/ drugshortages/default.cfm. List of current drug shortages according to ASHP can 
be found at: http://www.ashp.org/menu/DrugShortages/CurrentShortages. The two lists may have discrep-
ancies and differences because the intent and audience for each list is different. While FDA’s list is for 
the general public and compiled by reports mainly from the drug manufacturers, ASHP’s list is for 
healthcare practitioners and compiled by reports from anyone (e.g. practitioners, patients, manufacturers). 
FDA defines a drug to be in shortage when the supply from all providers does not meet the demand. FDA 
has a general public health perspective. On the other hand, ASHP considers a drug to be in shortage until 
every version by every manufacturer has returned to supply the product. This is useful for a practitioner 
looking to see why all of a sudden a certain type of drug is no longer available and what other manufac-
turer(s) may be able to provide it. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., AM. SOC’Y HEALTH-SYS. PHARM., & U. 
UTAH DRUG INFO. SERVICE, CONTRASTING THE FDA (CDER) AND ASHP DRUG SHORTAGE 
WEBSITES:WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES? (2014), http://www.ashp.org/DocLibrary/Policy/ DrugShort-
ages/FDA-versus-ASHP.pdf. 
 237. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2013). 
 238. Since outsourcing facilities are exempt from manufacturing requirements (e.g., NDA) that are 
very time consuming (i.e., years), customized drug compounds would be made quicker upon order. See 
supra notes 25, 42. 
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supplying the needed drugs in shortage will depend on FDA’s list of bulk drug 
substances. 
Each year from 2007 to 2011, there was an increase in reported new drug 
shortages with a record of 255 shortages in 2011.239 Although 2012 saw the low-
est number of reported drug shortages since 2006 (195 shortages), the number of 
active drug shortages240 was still very high.241 The number of active shortages 
tripled between 2007 and 2012—from 154 in 2007 to 456 in 2012.242 This 
demonstrates that shortages are lasting longer.243 The average duration of drug 
shortages from 2007 to June 2013 was 340 days.244 
Of these drug shortages, many were considered critical because no alterna-
tives were available to substitute the products in shortage.245 Most of these short-
ages involved either generic sterile injectable drugs or drugs from classes asso-
ciated with more critical health care situations, such as anesthesia, 
cardiovascular, and anti-infective.246 As a consequence, hospitals and clinics in-
creasingly relied on compounding pharmacies to fill those gaps and provide un-
interrupted health care in their facilities.247 
After the passage of the DQSA, outsourcing facilities can continue to pro-
vide drugs in shortage reliably and safely, but it will depend on FDA’s compila-
tion of bulk drug substances.248 Under the DQSA, an outsourcing facility can 
 
 239. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-194, DRUG SHORTAGES: PUBLIC HEALTH 
THREAT CONTINUES, DESPITE EFFORTS TO HELP ENSURE PRODUCT AVAILABILITY 11 (2014) [hereinafter 
GAO DRUG SHORTAGE REPORT]. 
 240. Active drug shortages = newly reported shortages + ongoing shortages that may have started in 
prior years. Id. at 13 n.29. 
 241. Id. at 11, 13. 
 242. Id. at 13–14. 
 243. See id. at 14 (showing in 2007, of the 154 actives shortages only 40 were ongoing shortages 
versus in 2012, of the 456 active shortages, 261 were ongoing shortages). 
 244. Id. at 12. 
 245. GAO DRUG SHORTAGE REPORT, supra note 239, at 14; see also Guharoy, supra note 29, at 898 
(highlighting that in a 2012 survey of 3,063 anesthesiologists, 7% had to postpone and 4% had to cancel 
because of anesthetic shortage); see also Jennifer C. Goldsack, Impact of Shortages of Injectable Oncology 
Drugs on Patient Care, 71 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARM. 571, 572 (2014) (illustrating the significant rates 
in delays of chemotherapy due to drug shortages). 
 246. GAO DRUG SHORTAGE REPORT, supra note 239, at 14–16 (nothing that anesthetic and central 
nervous system, anti-infective, and cardiovascular agents are the top three classes of drugs in shortage at 
17%, 16%, and 12% respectively). Examples of central nervous system drugs in shortage include propofol 
and diazepam; anti-infective drugs in shortage include acyclovir and doxycycline; cardiovascular drugs 
in shortage include nitroglycerin and verapamil. Id. at 16 n.32. 
 247. Id. at 18–19. 
 248. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2013). A bulk substance is “any substance that is represented for 
use in a drug and that, when used in the manufacturing, processing, or packaging of a drug, becomes an 
active ingredient or a finished dosage form of the drug, but the term does not include intermediates used 
in the synthesis of such substances.” 21 C.F.R. § 207.3(a)(4) (2015). 
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compound using a bulk drug substance as long as that bulk substance is on FDA’s 
Section 503B Bulk List.249 
For FDA, there must be a significant and substantial reason to allow an 
outsourcing facility to produce a drug product that may already be available by 
a manufacturer.250 After two Federal Register notices in December 2013 and 
July 2014, many bulk drug substances were nominated and rejected by FDA.251 
As of October 2015, FDA published another notice in the Federal Register for 
nominations directing interested parties to give a detailed report of why a specific 
bulk drug substance should be on the Section 503B Bulk List: 
 A statement describing the medical condition(s) that the drug prod-
uct to be compounded with the nominated bulk drug substances is in-
tended to treat; 
 A list of FDA-approved drug products, if any, that address the same 
medical condition; 
 If there are any FDA-approved drug products that address the same 
medical condition, an explanation of why a compounded drug product 
is necessary; 
 If the approved drug product is not suitable for a particular patient 
population, an estimate of the size of the population that would need 
a compounded drug product; 
 A bibliography of safety and efficacy data for the drug product com-
pounded using the nominated substance, if available, including any 
relevant peer-reviewed medical literature; and 
 If there is an FDA-approved drug product that includes the bulk 
drug substance nominated, and explanation of why the drug product 
proposed to be compounded must be compounded from bulk rather 
than with the FDA-approved drug product.252 
The alternative to compounding copies of FDA approved products from 
bulk drug substances is if an ingredient is on the drug shortage list at the time of 
compounding, distribution, and dispensing of the compounded product.253 This 
service may become invaluable to the current state of health care, as the number 
 
 249. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(a)(2)(A) (2013). 
 250. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: INTERIM POLICY ON 
COMPOUNDING USING BULK DRUG SUBSTANCES UNDER SECTION 503B OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, 
AND COSMETIC ACT 3 (Oct. 2015) [hereinafter BULK SUBSTANCES GUIDANCE] (emphasizing that a bulk 
substance must have a clinical need in order to be nominated). 
 251. BULK SUBSTANCES GUIDANCE, supra note 250, at 3–4 (noting that each notice had over 2,000 
nominations and most of them were rejected due to various reasons including not being a bulk drug sub-
stance, being a biological drug as opposed to being a small molecule chemical drug, being withdrawn 
from the market, or not including sufficient information for evaluation). 
 252. Bulk Drug Substances That Can Be Used To Compound Drug Products in Accordance With 
Section 503B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; Establishment of a Public Docket, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 65770 (Oct. 27, 2015).   
 253. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2013). 
   
326 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 19:293 
of drug shortages remains high.254 However, at the rate FDA is compiling a bulk 
drug substance list, it seems like it will be some time until outsourcing facilities 
will be able to freely compound from bulk substances and target drug shortages. 
Although FDA’s interim guidance states that FDA will not take action on an 
outsourcing facility compounding with a bulk drug substance not on the Section 
503B Bulk List and not on the drugs shortage list until the agency finalizes its 
list and guidance,255 it would be prudent for FDA to issue a bulk substance list 
that will always be revisable so that outsourcing facilities will not take advantage 
of this grace period. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The health crisis created by NECC demonstrated three major issues in drug 
compounding: the need for regulatory clarity, uniform standards, and a new cat-
egory of drug distributors. The DQSA attempts to address these problems by 
clearly establishing FDA authority over a new class of drug distributors called 
outsourcing facilities.256 An outsourcing facility is neither a pharmacy nor a man-
ufacturer. An outsourcing facility is a unique in-between entity that needs to reg-
ister with FDA and follow strict CGMP requirements similar to a manufacturer, 
but it has the flexibility to create drug products without going through the pre-
market approval process.257 
As of April 2016, there are fifty-nine registered outsourcing facilities.258 
Since the enactment of the DQSA, FDA has been busy exercising its restored 
authority over large-scale compounding. So far, the agency has conducted over 
230 inspections of compounding facilities (of which sixty were outsourcing fa-
cilities), issued over seventy-five warning letters, and overseen over eighty-five 
recalls where some resulted in ceasing operations.259 However, more than regu-
latory enforcement is needed. FDA needs to join forces with state authorities to 
clarify each other’s roles, decide what types of licensure or registration will be 
necessary beyond federal registration as an outsourcing facility, and identify uni-
form standards for all aspects of compounding, including repackaging.  Moreo-
ver, FDA needs to develop a bulk drug substance list for outsourcing facilities in 
a timely fashion so that outsourcing facilities have the opportunity to help alle-
viate drug shortages sooner than later. Outsourcing facilities can fulfill the niche 
 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 242–243. 
 255. BULK SUBSTANCES GUIDANCE, supra note 250, at 7. 
 256. See supra Part II.B. 
 257. 21 U.S.C. § 353b(a) (2013); see also CGMP GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 2. 
 258. Registered Outsourcing Facilities, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (last updated Apr. 8, 
2016),http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Pharmacy Compound-
ing/ucm378645.htm. 
 259. Jane Axelrod, Associate Director of Policy, CDER and Agency Lead on Compounding, Food & 
Drug Law Institute Presentation: Title I Implementation—Pharmacy Compounding in 2016 (Feb. 23, 
2016). 
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that contemporary health care needs has created by providing customized drug 
products quickly and safely for specific subsets of patients. Sterile compounded 
drugs will help provide uninterrupted health care. 
The DQSA is the legal clarity needed to address the issues of large-scale 
compounding and has the potential to prevent another NECC incident. However, 
it is up to FDA (in close partnership with the states) to efficiently and effectively 
enforce the law to pursue the goal of safe production and distribution of sterile 
compounds nationwide. FDA has an essential role in evolving the new law so 
that inherent safety will lead to a protected marketplace where compounds will 
become reliable sources of drug products and alternatives to manufactured drug 
products. The DQSA is a much-needed step forward for contemporary health 
care that will use compounding as a form of delivering consistently safe drugs. 
